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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee.
v.

Consolidated Case No. 20150640-CA

DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
Defendant and Appellant,

CONSOLIDATED BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
UT.AH

CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(e) and UT. R. APP. P. 3 provide this Court with

jurisdiction over this appeal from the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, dated August 13, 2015,
(Criminal No. 141500765; Appellate Case No. 20150640) (the "20150640 Judgment"); the
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment, dated August 12, 2015, (Criminal No. 141500701; Appellate

Case No. 20150641); (the "20150640 Judgment"; and collectively with the 20150641
Judgment; the 20150642 Judgment; the 20150704; and the 20150707 Judgment the
"Judgments") the Judgment, Sentence, Commitment, dated August 12, 2015, (Criminal No.

151500293; Appellate Case No. 20150642); (the "20150640 Judgment"; and collectively with
the 20150641 Judgment; the 20150642 Judgment; the 20150704; and the 20150707 Judgment
the "Judgments") the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, dated August 12, 2015, (Criminal No.
141500700; Appellate Case No. 20150704); (the "20150640 Judgment"; and collectively with
the 20150641 Judgment; the 20150642Judgment; the 20150704; and the 20150707 Judgment
the "Judgments") and the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, dated August 12, 2015, (Criminal
No. 151500294; Appellate Case No. 20150707) (the "20150640 Judgment"; and collectively
I
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with the 20150641 Judgment; the 20150642 Judgment; the 20150704; and the 20150707
Judgment the "Judgments''); by the Honorable Keith C. Barnes of the Fifth District Court,
Iron County, State of Utah.

A copy of the 20150640 Judgment is attached hereto as

Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. A copy of the 20150641 Judgment
is attached hereto as Addendum ''B" and incorporated herein by this reference. A copy of the
20150642 Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum "C" and incorporated herein by this
reference. A copy of the 20150704 Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum "D" and
incorporated herein by this reference. A copy of the 20150707 Judgment is also attached
hereto as Addendum "E" and incorporated herein by this reference.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, PRESERVATION AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing by improper!J weighing mitigating and
ISSUE I:
aggravating cin11mstances, particular/y given the proximate cause of the crimes attributable to defendant's
physical disabilities where application ofthe American's With Disabilities Act, ('~A'; is non-discretionary
far public entities providing seroices, in addition to extenuatingfami!J cin11mstances with defendant's ftancie 's
diagnosis with progressive cancer, and well as defendant's sincere remorse and acceptance of accountability;
instead giving greater weight to the number of mines committed and that defendant's brother was direct!J
impaded?

PRESERVATION: After pleading guilty to two (2) counts of DUI, one count of
Identity Theft, one count of Forgery, and one count of Failure to Register as a Sex Offender,
Atkinson addressed the court at the sentencing hearing held July 21, 2015. Atkinson addressed
the trial court stating that his fiance was unable to make it to his sentencing because she had
been diagnosed with cervical cancer that had moved into her organs. R106:5. Atkinson asked
for a chance so that he could be there for his fiance and his family. Id. Atkinson admitted that
he had made mistakes in the past but was committed to doing the right thing and to no longer
put himself in those situations. Id. Atkinson indicated that he had recently been declared
2
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disabled due to a back injury, needed shoulder surgery, and realized he was self-medicating
with illegal substances. R 106:6. In the Assessment presented to the court, Atkinson described
his injuries as a "chronic medical problem which interferes with his life." Atkinson indicated
that his lower spine was deteriorating partly from a prior injury and also genetics. (20150641)
R0012; (20150704) R0013. Atkinson referenced a car accident in which he had been involved
that resulted in his suffering neck, shoulder, and knee injuries as well as damage to his spine
and back. Id. Atkinson's trial counsel, Jeffrey Slack, requested that Atkinson be allowed to
serve county time on probation to a substance abuse treatment center. R106:4.

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW (UT. R. APP. P.9(d)(4)): ''We will not
overturn a sentence unless it exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, the judge failed to
consider all legally relevant factors, or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to
constitute abuse of discretion." State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, ,i 3, 73 P.3d 991 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Bqyd, 2001 UT 30, ,I 31, 25 P.3d 985.
''The decision whether to grant or deny probation rests 'within the sound discretion of the
judge who hears the case."' State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ,i 59, 191 P.3d 17; cited with approval

State v. Erskine, 2011 UT 49, ,nf2, 4, 246 P.3d 1218. "An appellate court may only find abuse
'if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court."'

Id (quoting State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah App. 1995)); see Erskine at ,I 4.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following determinative constitutional and statutory provisions are attached hereto as
Attachment "F" in accordance with UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(6):
A. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI

3
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B. Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §794(a) and (b)(1)(A) and (B)

C. ADA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102
D. ADA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131

E. ADA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132
F. UT. R. CRIMP. 22(a)
G. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-201(2)
H. UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-1(2)(a)

STATEMENT OF CASE1
On November 13, 2014, the State filed an Information charging Atkinson with one (1)
count of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Third Degree Felony; and
one (1) count of Alcohol Restricted Driver, a Class B Misdemeanor under district court case
number 141500701. (20150641) R00l-2. The State issued a Summons for Atkinson to report to
the Iron County Jail to be booked and released. (20150641) R007-8.
On November 13, 2014, the State filed a second Information charging Atkinson with
one (1) count of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a third degree felony;
one (1) count of Alcohol Restricted Driver, a class B misdemeanor; (1) count of Failure to
Stay in One Lane, a class C Misdemeanor; one (1) count of Open Container in a Vehicle, a
class C misdemeanor; and one (1) count of Failure to Wear Safety Belt or Use Child Restraint,
an infraction under district court case number 141500700. (20150704) R00l-3. The State filed

This appeal is a consolidation of five separate cases involving the same defendant. For
purposes of this section, the records are identified separately by their appellate numbers.
1
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a Summons for Atkinson to be booked into and released from the Iron County Jail. (20150704)
R00S-9.
On December 18, 2014, the State filed a third Information charging Atkinson with one
(1) count of Failure to Register as a Sex Offender, a third degree felony; and one (1) count of
Retail Theft, a class B Misdemeanor under district court case number 141500765. (20150640)
R003-4.
On December 22, 2014, Atkinson's Substance Use Disorder Assessment (the
"Assessment") was filed with the trial court. (20150641) R00l 1-4; (20150704) R0012-5.

During the Assessment, Atkinson expressed that his main goal for treatment would be to
"remain sober."

Atkinson described his injuries as a "chronic medical problem which

interferes with his life." (20150641) R0012; (20150704) R0013. Atkinson indicated that his
lower spine was deteriorating partly from a prior injury and also genetics. Atkinson referenced
a car accident in which he had been involved that resulted in his suffering neck, shoulder, and
knee injuries as well as damage to his spine and back. (20150641)Id; (20150704) Id.
In the Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (the "Screening Inventory'') portion of
the Assessment, Annie Yahne (''Yahne''), a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, noted the
following:
Atkinson's scores indicate he is at a relatively high risk for legal problems and
other types of norm violations. Since substance usage increased the likelihood
of impulsive control problems, the treatment plan should include a component
directed toward substance use, if there is any indication that the client is at a
high risk for developing substance use problems. Structured, didactic, cognitivebehavioral interventions may be helpful.
(20150641) R0012-3; (20150704) R0013-4. At the end of Atkinson's Assessment, Yahne
recommended the following for Atkinson:
5
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It is recommended that Atkinson receive Level 1.0 Outpatient Treatment. This
will consist of psycho-educational classes such as Prime for Life to assist him in
identifying the consequences of high-risk behaviors, as well as determining his
risk factors due to genetics and the environment. Additionally, it is
recommended that Atkinson receive a minimum of four individual mental
health counseling sessions to address underlying issues that may be directly or
indirectly contributing to his substance problems. These sessions should be
held weekly or bi-weekly. Finally, it is recommended that Atkinson attend a
minimum of four support groups specific to alcohol recovers such as AA or a
12 Step Recovery Group. As noted on the SATS Scale, due to his desire for a
different lifestyle and the changes he is making to that end, he is likely to engage
in treatment and seek out contact with a case manager or counselor. Atkinson
has already looked into registering for a Prime For Life class which will provide
psycho-education and access to information regarding community resources
that may prove helpful in some manner. In the event that he receives any
alcohol-related charges in the future, it would be appropriate for him to
immediately begin a Level IL 1-Intensive Outpatient Counseling Program or
higher.
(20150641) R0014; (20150704) R0015.
Atkinson initially appeared on January 6, 2015, for district court case numbers
141500765, 141500701, 141500700, at which time he was provided a copy of the Jnjo1711ation
and a preliminary hearing was scheduled for February 4, 2015. (20150640) R0015; (20150641)
R0024; (20150704) R0020. Also during the initial appearance, Atkinson filled out an Affidavit

of Indigenq. The trial court appointed Jeffrey Slack ("Slack'') to represent Atkinson under
district court case numbers 141500765 and 141500701. (20150640) R0020; (20150641) R0023.
The trial court also appointed Jack Burns ("Bums'') to represent Atkinson under district court
case number 141500700. (20150704) R0027.
On February 4, 2015, Slack moved for a continuance of the preliminary hearing in
district court case numbers 141500765, 141500700 and 141500701 because Atkinson was not
present. (20150640) R0034; (20150704) R0039; (20150641) R0036. The trial court granted the
continuance and ordered Atkinson to pay witness fees prior to the next preliminary hearing
6
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that was scheduled for February 11, 2015. (20150640) Id; (20150704) Id; (20150641) Id. On
February 11, 2015, Atkinson's preliminary hearing was re-scheduled again due to a
miscommunication that lead the State to call-off their witnesses who would be testifying under
district court case number 141500765. (20150640) R0036. Atkinson had not paid the $92.50
in witness fees, but committed to have the fee paid by the end of the week. (20150640) Id.

On February 11, 2015, Atkinson's preliminary hearing was held under district court
~

case numbers 141500700 and 141500701. (20150704) R0041-2; (20150641) R0038-9. After the
receiving of the evidence, the trial court found that the State had presented sufficient evidence
regarding the crimes with which Atkinson had been charged and bound him over for trial.
(20150704) R0042; (20150641) R0038.
On March 4, 2015, Atkinson waived his preliminary hearing under district court case
number 141500765 and an arraignment hearing was scheduled for April 4, 2015. (20150640)
R0038. On March 27, 2015, Burns stipulated to a trial continuance under district court case
number 141500700, which was submitted by the State for the reason of witness unavailability
(20150704) R0052-3.
On March 31, 2015, Atkinson entered a not-guilty plea under district court case number
141500701 and the trial court scheduled a one (1) day jury trial to be held May 22, 2015.
(20150641) R0040-1.
On April 14, 2015, Atkinson entered a not-guilty plea under district court case number
141500765 and the trial court scheduled a one (1) day jury trial for June 4, 2015. (20150640)
R0040. Also on April 14, 2015, Slack stipulated to a trial continuance under district court case
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number 141500701, which was submitted by the State for the reason of witness unavailability.
(20150641) R0052.
On May 22, 2015, the State filed a fourth Information charging Atkinson with one (1)
count of Identity Fraud, a third degree felony; one (1) count of Forgery, a third degree felony;
one (1) count of Obtaining a Prescription Under False Pretenses, a third degree felony; and
one (1) count of Theft, a class B misdemeanor under district court case number 151500293.
(20150642) R000l-3.

Also on May 22, 2015, the State filed a fifth Information charging

Atkinson with one (1) count of Identity Fraud, a second degree felony; one (1) count of Theft,
a second degree felony; one (1) count of Forgery, a third degree felony; three (3) counts of
Obtaining a Prescription Under False Pretenses, a third degree felony under district court case
number 151500294. (20150707) R000l-3.
On May 26, 2015, Atkinson had an Initial Appearance under district court case
numbers 151500293 and 151500294, at which time a preliminary hearing was scheduled for
June 2, 2015. (20150642) R0014-5 and (20150707) R0012-4. During the Initial Appearance,
Atkinson filled out an Affidavit of Indigenq (20150642) R0007-1; (20150707) R0006-1. On the

Affidavit under employer information, Atkinson listed that disability insurance was his sole
source of income. (20150642) R0007; (20150707) R0006. The trial court found Atkinson to
be indigent and appointed Slack to represent Atkinson under district court case number
151500293. (20150642) R0011. The trial court additionally appointed Burns to represent
Atkinson under district court case number 151500294. (20150707) R0010.
On June 2, 2015, a consolidated change of plea hearing was held for all five (5) of
Atkinson's cases. Du.ring the hearing, Atkinson plead guilty to one (1) count of Failure to
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Register as a Sex Offender, a third degree felony under district court case number 141500765
(20150640, R0064); one (1) count of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/ or Drugs,
a third degree felony under district court case number 141500701 (20150641, R0065); one (1)
count of Identity Fraud, a third degree felony, under district court case number 151500293
(20150642, R0023-4); one (1) count of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs,
a third degree felony under district court case number 141500700 (20150704, R0065); and one
~

(1) count of Forgery, a third degree felony under district court case number 151500294.
(20150707, R0025).
The trial court scheduled a consolidated sentencing hearing in all five (5) cases and
ordered Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P'') to prepare a pre-sentence report ("PSI"). The
State filed five (5) separate Amended Information to reflect Atkinson's guilty pleas in five (5) of
his criminal cases.

(20150640) R0051-2; (20150641) R0077-8; (20150642) R0025-6;

(20150704) R0066-7; (20150707) R0037-8. Atkinson initialed and signed five (5) separate
Statement of the Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certijicate of Counsel, and Order, which were
filed with the trial court on June 2, 2015 (collectively referred to as the "Plea Agreement").
(20150640) R0054-3; (20150641) R0067-6; (20150642) R0027-6; (20150704) R0068-8;
(20150707) R0027-6.
One PSI report was drafted for all five (5) of Atkinson's cases and filed with the trial
court on July 16, 2015. (20150640) R0067-8; (20150641) R0081; (20150704) R00S0-1;
(20150642) R0038-9; (20150707) R0042-9. AP&P recommended that Atkinson be sentenced
according to statute to a term of zero (0) to five (5) years in the Utah State Prison and be
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $5,000.00 under district court case numbers 141500700,
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141500701, 141500765, 151500293 and 151500294. Jd. AP&P further recommended Atkinson
pay restitution in the amount of$7,747.47 to Valley View Medical Center under district court
case number 151500594. (20150640) R0068; (20150641) R0081; (20150642) R0039;
(20150704) R0081; (20150707) R0043. The PSI report suggested that Atkinson's sentencing
matrix was intermediate sanctions/prison and that Atkinson needed a substance abuse
evaluation and treatment. (20150640) R0068-9; (20150641) Id; (20150642) Id; (20150704)
R0081; (20150707) R0043-4.
Atkinson provided a handwritten statement to be included in his PSI report. In the
statement, Atkinson referred to his two (2) Driving Under the Influence offenses and how he
"was trying to self-medicate with alcohol for the pain [he] was in." Atkinson admitted that
because of the choices he had made, his fiance and other family members had been financially
victimized. Atkinson also realized that he had taken advantage of his brother by using his
name, and hoped that his brother would "find it in his heart to forgive [him] one day."
Atkinson further stated that he had recently been declared disabled. Atkinson indicated that
all of his offenses were "linked to [him] trying to self-medicate." Atkinson expressed to the
trial court that having medical insurance would enable him to be properly treated. Atkinson
expressed that he wanted to try to avoid making poor choices in his life. (20150640) R0076;
(20150641) R0089; (20150642) R0047; (20150704) R0089; (20150707) R0051. AP&P did not
list any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that could have been considered during
sentencing. (20150640) R0084; (20150641) R0097; (20150642) R0055; (20150704) R0097;
(20150707) R0059.
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Atkinson submitted a letter to the trial court on July 17, 2015. (20150642) R0056-7. In
the letter, Atkinson expressed remorse for the crimes that he had committed and apologized
to the trial court and his family. (20150642) R0056. Atkinson indicated that he had recently
been declared disabled by the State of Utah, Judge Patricia Lammi and that he could provide
documentation to prove that fact. Id. Atkinson indicated that his fiance had been diagnosed
with cancer. Id. Atkinson expressed that the thought of not being able to be there for his
fiance in her time of need was a harsher punishment than any sentence the trial court imposed.

Id. Atkinson requested a lenient sentence and indicated that having been declared disabled
would allow him to receive the proper treatment that he needed. (20150642) ROOS?.
A consolidated sentencing hearing was held on July 21, 2015. Under district court case
number 141500765, Atkinson was sentenced to Failure to Register as a Sex Offender, a third
degree felony, and ordered to serve an indeterminate term of not to exceed five (5) years in
the Utah State Prison. (20150640) R0086-7. Atkinson was ordered to pay a court security fee
in the amount of $33. Id.

Under district court case number 141500700, Atkinson was

sentenced to Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a third degree felony,
and ordered to serve an indeterminate term of not to exceed five (5) years in the Utah State
Prison. (20150704) R0098-9. Atkinson was ordered to pay a court security fee in the amount
of $33. Id. Under district court case number 141500701, Atkinson was sentenced to Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a third degree felony, and ordered to serve an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five (5) years in the Utah State Prison. (20150641) R0099.
Atkinson was ordered to pay a court security fee in the amount of $33. Id. Under district court
case number 151500293, Atkinson was sentenced to Identity Fraud, a third degree felony, and
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ordered to serve an indeterminate term of not to exceed five (5) years in the Utah State Prison.
(20150642) R0061. Atkinson was ordered to pay a court security fee in the amount of $33. Id.
Under district court case number 151500294, Atkinson was sentenced to Forgery, a third
degree felony, and ordered to serve an indeterminate term of not to exceed five (5) years in
the Utah State Prison (20150707) R0062. Atkinson was ordered to pay a court security fee in
the amount of $33. Id. The trial court ordered that district court case numbers 141500701,
141500765, 141500700, and 141500294 run concurrently; however, district court case number
151500293 would run consecutively. (20150640) R0087; (20150704) R0099; (20150641)
R0099; (20150642) R0061; (20150707) R0062.
A letter written by a correctional officer with the Iron County Jail was filed with the
trial court on July 21, 2015. (20150640) R0085, (20150642) R0059; (20150641) Rl00;
(20150704) RlO0; (20150707) R0060. The letter provided details of how Atkinson had
rendered aid to the correctional officer without any regards to his own personal safety.
(20150640) R0085, (20150642) R0059; (20150641) Rl00; (20150704) Rl00; (20150707)
R0060.
On July 28, 2015, a restitution hearing was held under district court case number
151500294.

(20150707) R0064.

During the restitution hearing, the court ordered that

Atkinson pay restitution to Valley View Medical Center in the amount of $6,126.91 as a direct
result of his criminal activity. (20150707) Id.
On July 31, 2015, five (5) separate Notice

of Order of Bail/Commitment/Release order of

Transportation to Prison were filed, which remanded Atkinson to the custody of the Iron County
Sheriff pending the transportation to the Utah State Prison to serve a term zero (0) to five (5)
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years

tn

criminal case numbers 141500765, 141500701, 151500293, 141500700 and

151500294. (20150640) R0088; (20150461) R101; (20150642) R0062; (20150704) R101,
(20150707) R0071. The Order also indicated that district court case numbers 141500765,
141500701, 151500294 and 141500700 would run concurrently and that district court case

number 201500293 would run concurrent. (20150640), (20150461), (20150642), (20150704),
(20150707) Id.

On August 3, 2015, Atkinson filed three (3) separate Notice

Substitution

of Appeal and Notice of

of Counsel and Withdraw under district court case numbers 141500765, 141500701,

151500293. (20150640) R0089; (20150461) R102; (20150642) R0063. On August 4, 2015,

Matthew Carling, filed his Notice

ofAppearance of Counsel (Appellate Matter)

under district court

case numbers 141500765, 141500701 and 151500293. (20150640) R0093; (20150641) R108;
(20150642) R0069.

On August 5, 2015, an Order of"Restitution was entered that indicated Atkinson must pay
restitution in the amount of $6,126.91 to Valley View Medical Center under district court case
number 151500294. (20150707) R0072. On August 11, 2015, Matthew Carling filed his Notice

of Appearance of Counsel

(Appellate Matter) under district court case numbers 141500701,

151500293. (20150641) R108 and (20150642) R0069.

On August 12, 2015, the 20150641 Judgment, 20150642 Judgment, 20150704
Judgment, and the 20150707 Judgment were filed with the trial court. (20150641) R116-8;
(20150642) R0077-9; (20150704) R107-9; (20150707) R0081-3. The 20150641 Judgment

indicated that Atkinson had plead guilty to the offense of Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol and/or Drugs, a third degree felony. (20150641) Rl 17.

The 20150642 Judgment
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indicated that Atkinson had plead guilty to the offense of Identity Fraud, a third degree felony.
(20150642) R0078. The 20150704 Judgment indicated that Atkinson had plead guilty to the
offense of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/ or Drugs, a third degree felony.
(20150704) R108. The 20150707 Judgment indicated that Atkinson had plead guilty to the
offense of Forgery, a third degree felony.

(20150707) R0082. In each of the four (4)

Judgments, Atkinson was sentenced to serve a term of zero (0) to five (5) years in the Utah
State Prison and placed into the custody of the Utah Department of Corrections. (20150641)
Rl 17; (20150642) R0078; (20150704) R108; and (20150707) R0082. Atkinson was ordered to
pay a total of $33 for a court security fee in all three Judgments. (20150641 ), (20150642),
(20150704), and (20150707) Id. The trial court ordered that the sentence imposed in the
20150641, 20150640, 20150642, and 20150704 Judgments be served concurrently and the
sentence imposed in the 20150707 Judgment served consecutively. (20150641), (20150642),
(20150704), and (20150707) Id.
On August 13, 2015, the 20150640 Judgment was filed with the trial court. (20150640)
R101-3. The 20150640 Judgment indicated that Atkinson had plead guilty to the offense of
Failure to Register as a Sex Offender, a third degree felony. (20150640) R101. Atkinson was
sentenced to serve a term of zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison and placed into
the custody of the Utah Department of Corrections. (20150640) R102. Atkinson was ordered
to pay a total of $33 for a court security fee. (20150640) R102. The trial court ordered that the
sentence imposed be served concurrently with the sentences imposed in the 20150704,
141500701 Judgments and be served consecutively with the 20150707 Judgment. (20150640)
R102.
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On August 19, 2015, counsel herein filed a Notice of Appeal under district court case
number 141500700. (20150704) Rl 14. On August 25, 2015, Atkinson's attomey,Jack Bums,
filed a Notice

of Substitution of Counsel

under district court case numbers 141500700 and

151500294. (20150704) Rl 12 and (20150707) R0086. On August 25, 2015, counsel herein filed

a Notice ofAppeal under district court case number 151500294. (20150707) R0088. This Court
consolidated the 20150640, 20150641, 20150642 and the 20150704 Judgments prior to
briefing on September 8, 2015. (20150640) R107. The Court consolidated the 20150707
Judgment with the 20150640 Judgment on October 14, 2015.

STATEMENT OF FACTS2
A. Sentencing Hearing - July 21, 2015
Atkinson came before the trial court on July 21, 2015, for a consolidated sentencing on
a total of seven (7) criminal cases under district court case numbers 141500765, 141500701,
151500293, 141500700, 151500018 and 151500097. R106:2. Slack had an opportunity to

review the PSI report prior to sentencing. Id. The State indicated that Atkinson had five (5)
cases before the court for sentencing with two (2) cases being dismissed. R106:3. The State
stipulated to the recommendations outlined in the PSI report. Id. The State argued that
Atkinson has had a ''bad couple of years in terms of criminal activity," and recommended that
some of his cases run consecutively. Id.
Slack argued that the underlying issue that needed to be addressed with Atkinson was
his "substance abuse issue." Id. Slack further argued that in all of Atkinson's cases, his

All transcript references herein arc to Appellate Case No. 20150640, although the hearings
were consolidated between the five matters.
2

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

substance abuse played a role in the behaviors he was exhibiting. Slack argued that the majority
of the charges would not have existed but for Atkinson's underlying issue with substance
abuse. R106:4. Slack sought that Atkinson be sentenced to probation and that Atkinson only
be released from county time for the purpose of treatment, which he would be required to
possess and obtain. Id. Slack sought for Atkinson to receive one (1) more final opportunity
to prove that he was serious about treatment and to show that the underlying issue was his
substance abuse. Id.

In the alternative, Slack requested Atkinson's sentences run concurrently and his
substance abuse issues be taken into consideration if the trial court found that prison was the
appropriate sentence. Id. Slack further requested that if prison was the trial court's option,
that the judgment contain a statement that would admonish or exhort the Board of Pardons
to ensure that Atkinson received the substance abuse treatment he needed. Id. Slack referred
the trial court to a letter that had been written by a correctional officer on Atkinson's behalf.
R106:5. The letter provided details of how Atkinson had acted selflessly and rendered aid to
another individual. Id.
Atkinson addressed the trial court stating that his fiance was unable to make it to his
sentencing because she had been diagnosed with cervical cancer that had moved into her
organs. Id. Atkinson asked for a chance so that he could be there for his fiance and his family.

Id. Atkinson admitted that he had made mistakes in the past but was committed to doing the
right thing and to no longer put himself in those situations. Id. Atkinson indicated that he
obtained a substance abuse evaluation from Jamie through Cedar Walk-In; however, it did not
appear that the evaluation was presented in court. Id. Atkinson indicated that he had recently
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been declared disabled due to a back injury, needed shoulder surgery, and realized he was selfmedicating with illegal substances. R106:6. Atkinson indicated that he had recently provided
proof of Medicaid. Id. Medicaid would allow Atkinson to receive the proper treatment so he
could be there for his fiance and her daughter. Atkinson desired to do the right thing and not
appear in court again. Id.
The State further argued that Atkinson had been to prison and on parole before. Id.
The State indicated that Atkinson had several violations while on probation and/ or parole. Id.
The State indicated that Atkinson had several institutional disciplinary actions while being
incarcerated. The State felt that Atkinson was not amenable for county time nor probation.

Id.
The trial court applauded Atkinson for his assisting others while incarcerated and stated
"that is what we do as people." R106:7. The trial court stated that "we help people out when
they are in need, we try to be honest, and a productive member of society." Id. The trial court
expressed hope that Atkinson would make ''better decisions down the road." Id. The trial
court indicated that it was "not acceptable" that Atkinson plead guilty to five cases that had
occurred within the span of two years. Id. The trial court expressed that the number of offenses
committed and the offenses themselves were concerning. Id. The trial court also expressed
concern for the community being in harm's way, particularly when one of the victims was
Atkinson's own brother. Id.
The trial court sentenced Atkinson to serve zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State
Prison and pay a court security fee in the amount of $33 for the charge of Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol and/ or Drugs, a third degree felony under district court case number
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141500700 (20150704). Id. The trial court sentenced Atkinson to serve zero to five (0-5) years
in the Utah State Prison and pay a court security fee in the amount of $33 for the charge of
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/ or Drugs, a third degree felony under district
court case number 141500701 (20150641). Id. The trial court sentenced Atkinson to serve
zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison and pay a court security fee in the amount of
$33 for the charge of Failure to Register as a Sex Offender, a third degree felony under district
court case number 141500765 (20150640). R106:7-8. The trial court sentenced Atkinson to
serve zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison and pay a court security fee in the amount
of $33 for the charge of Identity Fraud, a third degree felony under district court case number
151500293 (20150642). Id. The trial court also sentenced Atkinson to serve zero to five (0-5)
years in the Utah State Prison and pay a court security fee in the amount of$33 for the charge
of Forgery, a third degree felony under district court case number 15150094 (20150707). Id.
The trial court ordered that district court case numbers 141500700 (20150704), 141500701
(20150641), 141500765 (20150640), and 151500294 (20150707) run concurrent; however,
district court case number 151500293 (20150642) would run consecutively. Id. Atkinson was
taken into the custody of the Department of Corrections to begin serving his sentence. Id.
The State indicated that under district court case number 151500294 (20150707), there
was a restitution claim in the amount of $7,747.74 to be paid to Valley View Medical Center.

Id. Slack stated that Atkinson is disputing the amount of restitution. Id. The State requested
a restitution hearing be held. Id. The trial court scheduled the restitution hearing. R106:9.
The trial court indicated that Atkinson had thirty (30) days from the sentencing date to
perfect an appeal by filing the appropriate paperwork with the court. Id. The trial court
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dismissed two (2) cases under district court case numbers 151500018 and 151500097 without
prejudice. Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion in weighing mitigating and aggravating factors for
sentencing Atkinson. It gave weight only to the number of crimes Atkinson had committed in
the prior two (2) years, and the fact that his brother was a victim of Atkinson's Identity Theft
charge; however, there were mitigating circumstances that were required to be given significant
weight. Atkinson's crimes were all a product to some degree of his disabilities, which rendered
him eligible for accommodations under the ADA, having admitted to the fact that he was selfmedicating while he was applying for disability benefits. Those benefits finally came through
during the pendency of these charges, which would have enabled Atkinson to obtain the
services and help needed. Further, Atkinson had extenuating family circumstances in that his
fiance was diagnosed with progressive cervical cancer and his family would face realistic
decimation if he were to be incarcerated in prison for any significant period of time away from
her. Atkinson was additionally sincerely remorseful for his actions, both orally in sentencing
as well as in a letter submitted to the court from Atkinson. These circumstances favored either
a downward departure after consideration thereof, or a suspended sentence with jail and/ or
probation, a suspended sentence in favor of probation to enable Atkinson to receive the care
he needed for his disabilities, or a sentence of probation given that such was available for these
charges. Instead, the trial court erroneously provided the maximum sentence on each charge,
a decision that requires reversal and remand for resentencing.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING BY
IMPROPERLY WEIGHING MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES.
UTAH CODE.ANN.§ 77-18-1(7) provides that "[a]t the time of sentence, the court shall

receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant ... desires to present concerning
the appropriate sentence." UT. R. CRIM. P. 22(a) states in pertinent part that, "[b]efore
imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement to
present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence
should not be imposed." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-201(2) then provides the following:
Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination
of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
"[A]ny mitigating or aggravating circumstances found by the trial court must be
supported by evidence, and the proponent of the circumstances bears the burden of proving
its existence by a preponderance of the evidence." Stale v. 1'v1oreno, 2005 UT App 200, 113, 113
P.3d 992. .A determination of aggravating or mitigating circumstances is a factual finding and

will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. See id. at iMI 12-13. ''This should not be read to
mean that the trial court's sentencing decision is beyond review. The trial court is charged with
identifying, on the record, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that affect its
sentencing decision, because '[s]entencing should be conducted with full information and with
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careful deliberation of all relevant factors."' Moreno at ,IlO, citing State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297
(Utah 1993). "Aggravating and mitigating factors are primarily concerned with the 'nature and
circumstances of the crime' and the 'defendant's character, background [or] history."' State v.
Agruelles, 2003 UT 1, ,IlOS, 63 P.3d 731. Our Utah Supreme Court has stated that, "[a]lthough
courts must consider all legally relevant factors in making a sentencing decision, not all
aggravating and mitigating factors are equally important, and '[o]ne factor in mitigation or
aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale.' Thus, several
mitigating circumstances claimed by a defendant may be outweighed by a few egregious
aggravating factors." State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ,I59, 191 P.3d 17 (alteration in
original)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
"A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of his
background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which underlie
the criminal justice system." State v. Undsey, 2014 UT App 288, ,i 12,340 P.3d 176, quoting State
v. M,Clendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). UTAH CODE.ANN. §76-3-402(1) states as follows:
If at the time of sentencing the court, having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to
the history and character of the defendant, and after having given any victims
present at the sentencing and the prosecuting attorney an opportunity to be
heard, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for
that degree of offense established by statute, the court may enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence
accordingly.

Ibid. Information concerning the appropriate sentence should relate to factors courts may
consider in making sentencing determinations, including "rehabilitation," "deterrence,
punishment, restitution, and incapacitation." State v. Soto/011go, 2003 UT App 214, ,r 5, 73 P.3d
991, q11oti~g State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah .App 1991). "So long as a statute clearly
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specifies the maximum allowable penalty, it is not unconstitutional for sentencing judges to
exercise their discretion in offering leniency." State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, 1114, 322 P.3d 624,
dting State v. She/by, 728 P .2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986).
This Court "will not overturn a sentence unless it exceeds statutory or constitutional
limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally relevant factors, or the actions of the judge
were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of discretion." Stale v. Post, 2015 UT App 162,

,i 2, 354 P.3d 810, quoting State

11•

Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, ,i 3, 73 P.3d 991(citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). "[TJhe exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily
reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse
only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial
court." State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah 1995), dting State v. Ge"ard, 584 P.2d 885,
887 (Utah 1978)(dting State v. Hams, 10 Wash.App. 509, 518 P.2d 237 (1974)). "The overriding
consideration is that the sentence be just." Id.
A Utah district court gave an insightful summation that "[p]robation 'is for people who
admit their guilt, acknowledge the enormity of what they have done and want to be
helped."' State v. Ash"Tf!ft, 2014 UT App 253, ,i 6,338 P.3d 247. "A defendant is not entitled to
probation, but rather the [trial] court is empowered to place the defendant on probation if it
thinks that will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the public interest." State
v. Ashcreft, 2014 UT App 253, 338 P.3d 247, citing State v. Valdovinos,2003 UT App 432, ,t 23,
82 P.3d 1167 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The
granting or \vithholding of probation involves considering intangibles of character, personality
and attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling. These matters which are to be
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considered in connection \\.':ith the prior record of the accused, are of such nature that the
problem of probation must of necessity rest '";thin the discretion of the judge who hears the
case." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App 1991), quoting State v. Silbert, 310 P.2d
388, 393 (1957). However, the "legal restriction" on such authority continues to exists, that
"the trial court not exceed the bounds of discretion." Id

A. THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE CRIMES WAS ATTRIBUTABLE TO
DEFENDANT'S PHYSICAL DISABILITIES, AND APPLICATION OF
THE AMERICAN'S WITH DISABILITIES ACT ("ADA") IS NONDISCRETIONARY ON THE COURT AS A PUBLIC ENTITY PROVIDING
A SERVICE.
"The Federal Constitution is the 'supreme law of the land', and the obligation to guard
and enforce every right secured by that constitution rests on the state courts equally with the
federal courts." Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 61 S. Ct. 572, 85 L. Ed. 859 (1941); State v.

Briggs, 2008 UT 83, ,I26, 199 P.3d 935. The Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA'') is based
in equality and states that, "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." ADA, 42
U.S.C.A. § 12132. The ADA's purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities" as well as
provide "enforceable standards" and "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority ... in
order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities."
42 U.S.C.A. §12101(b)(1), (2), and (4). Similarly, under 29 U.S.C.A. §794(a) and (b)(1)(A) and

(B) of the Rehabilitation Act, it states as follows:
(a) Promulgation of rules and regulations
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No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as
defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance ...
(b) 'CJlrogram or activity" defined
For the purposes of this section, the term "program or activity" means all of
the operations of-(1) (A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of
a State or of a local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance
and each such department or agency (and each other State or local governmental
entity) to which the assistance is extended, in case of assistance to a State or
local government; ...
any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
"[P]ublic entity" includes "(B) any department, agency, ... of a State or States or local
government; ...." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131. Our Utah Supreme Court recently acknowledged that
Utah state agencies and Utah courts are both considered "public entities" under this provision
of the ADA. See, State In Interest of KC, 2015 UT 92, ,i 16, 362 P.3d 1248. Although the state
agency in KC was the Division of Child and Family Services, their role is strikingly similar to
a probation officer. Probation is a public service provided by the Utah Department of
Corrections, Adult Probation & Parole, which public entity specifically lists the services
provided to the public as "acting in the role of a police officer, court adviser, mentor and social
worker" with duties that include "ensuring that they comply with conditions of probation ...
assist[ing] offenders with obtaining the basic essentials to survive ... includ[ing] housing,
employment,

school,

training,

food,

treatment,

http://corrections.utah.gov/index.php?option=com

therapy

and

counseling."

content&view=article&id=845:adult-

probation-parole&catid=10&Itemid=262, accessed March 4, 2016; see also UTAH CODE ANN.
§77-18-1 (8)(a)(viii)(listing payment for probation services as a possible condition of
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probation). Probation is commonly referred to by the courts as a "program." See, e.g., State v.
Robinson, 2014 UT App 114, ,i 15, 327 P.3d 589 (defendant failed to abide by his "zerotolerance probation program"); State v. Feme, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)(analyzing liability
of corrections officials to public under "parole and probation programs"), oveTTUled on other
grounds by Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64, 356 P.3d 1172; State v. LA., 2010 UT App
356, ,I2, 245 P.3d 213 (trial court referring to probation as "probation program" in its order).
A federal district court has indicated that both the management of state prisons and the
management of the court system are state or local responsibilities "of great importance" stating
that "all of these functions are routinely understood to be covered by the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA notwithstanding that these functions are not expressly referred to in either of
the statutes." Saunders v. Horn, 960 F.Supp. 893, 899 (E.D. Pa. 1997). In analysis of the ADA,
our United States Supreme Court stated that, "[a]s we have said before, the fact that a statute
can be ' "applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate
ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."'" Pmn!J1lvania Dep't of Con: v. Yesk~y, 524 U.S. 206, 210,
118 S. Ct. 1952, 1955, 141 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1998) dti11gSedima. S.P.RL ,,. Imre~,·Co.. 473 U.S.
479, 499, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3286, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) (citation omitted).
Although the ADA does not define the meaning of "services, programs or activates of
a public entity," the Rehabilitation Act defines a "program or activity" as "all of the operations
of ... a local government." Frame v. City ofArlington, 657 F.3d 215,225 (5 th Cir. 2011), citing 29
U.S.C. §794(b)(1)(A). The 10th Circuit in Frame further stated that "the Rehabilitation Act
prohibits disability discrimination by recipients of federal funding. Like Title II,§ 504 provides
that no qualified individual ,vith a disability 'shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
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excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.' The ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act generally are interpreted in pari materia" Id. at 223, dting 29 U.S.C. §794(a).
Our highest court found that ADA's Title II contains an "affirmative obligation to
accommodate" as a "reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate
end." Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. at 532-33, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed. 820 (2004). In Frame v.
Ci!J

of Arlington,

the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed this "affirmative obligation to

accommodate" under the ADA by holding that, "[d]rawing from the text of §12132, an injury
occurs (and a complete and present cause of action arises) under Title II when a disabled
individual has sufficient information to know that he has been denied the benefits of a service,
program, or activity of a public entity" however, "[t]he key point ... is that a ... wrongful act
and a disabled individual's injury need not coincide." Ibid., 657 F.3d 215 (5 th Cir. 2011). The
Court found that this would not create "unlimited potential ... liability" for the public entity
since that public entity could "avoid liability whenever it chooses simply by [providing ADA
protection] right the first time, or by fixing its original unlawful [violation]." Id.
In a recent federal district case from Illinois, the Court undertook the following analysis
of the ADA:
Although the Rehabilitation Act and ADA do not explicitly address
accommodations, their implementing regulations require public entities to make
certain reasonable modifications for disabled individuals. SeeC.F.R. §
35.130(6)(7). Accommodations are "only ... required when necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of a disability." Wis. Cm!J. Seros., Inc. v. City of
Milwaukee,465 F.3d 737, 751 (7th Cir.2006); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(6)(7). Necessary
means that "the desired accommodation will affirmatively enhance a disabled
plaintiffs quality of life by ameliorating the effects of the disability."Oconomowoc
Residential Programs v. City ofMilwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 784 (7th Cir.2002) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). Accommodations must also be
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"reasonable," 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(6)(7), meaning that "it is both efficacious and
proportional to the costs to implement it."Oconomowoc R.esidential Programs, 300
F.3d 775 at 784 (dtingVande Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,
543 (7th Cir.1995)). A particular accommodation is considered unreasonable if
the public entity "can demonstrate that making the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity." 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(6)(7).

Novak v. Hall, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2015 \XTL 5768569 (N.D. Illinois 2015).
To prevail on a ADA claim an individual "must establish: (1) that he ... is a qualified
individual with a disability; (2) that he ... was either excluded from participation in or denied the
benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise
discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
discrimination was by reason of [his] disability."' Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, ,I25, 46
P.3d 753, citing Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir.1999)(quoting Tyler v. Ci!J

of

Manhattan, 849 F.Supp. 1429, 1439 (D.Kan.1994)). As to qualifications for application of the
ADA, the ADA provides the following definitions:
(1) Disability
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).
(2) Major life activities
(A) In general
For purposes of paragraph (1 ), major life activities include, but are not limited to,
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.
(B) Major bodily functions
For purposes of paragraph (1 ), a major life activity also includes the operation of a
major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain,
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.
(3) Regarded as having such an impairment
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For purposes of paragraph (1 )(C):
(A) An individual meets the requirement of "being regarded as having such an
impairment" if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an
action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a
major life activity.
(B) Paragraph (l)(C) shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor.
A transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6
months or less.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12102. In Ball v. LeB/anc, the Fifth Circuit Court stated that a person can be
classified as disabled if he has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities. Id at 792 F.3d 584, 596-7 (5th Cir. 2015). The Court went on to
further state as follows:
The statute defines a major life activity in two ways. First, major life activities
include, but are not limited to: caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working. Id.§ 12102(2)(.A). Second, a major life activity includes "the operation
of a major bodily function." Id. § 12102(2)(B). Such functions include, but are
not limited to: the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel,
bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and
reproductive functions.

Ibid at 597. ''The ADA's protections extend to persons recovering from drug or alcohol
addiction." Pac. Shores Properties, LLC v. Ciry of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2013),

citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132.
''There are more than 54 million people in the United States who experience a form of
disability." Disabled World, "Substance Abuse and Persons with Disabilities", July 22, 2013,
http://w,nv.disabled-world.com/ medical/ pharmaceutical/ addiction/ serious.php.

''People

with disabilities experience many risks that increase their chances for substance abuse
negatively affecting their lives" such as societal enabling, health and medication issues, a lack
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of identification of possible issues, and a lack of appropriate and accessible prevention and
treatment services. Id. "As many as 1.5 million individuals with disabilities may need treatment
for substance abuse disorders in any given year." See, ''Physically and Developmentally
Disabled: Specialty Program for Physically and Developmentally Disabled Patients",
http://\v-vadsinc.com/ service/ specialty-program-for-physically-and-developmentallydisabled-patients/, accessed March 4, 2016, citing United States Department of Health and
Human Services. ''Persons with any type of disability experience substance abuse at rates 2 to
4 times greater than the general population." Id. That number substantially increases when the

person suffers spinal cord injuries, with the number approaching or exceeding 50%. Id.
"[S]ubstance abuse prevention, intervention and treatment services are not attitudinally,
physically, financially, or cognitively accessible to people with disabilities for a variety of
reasons." Disabled World (2013). The Social Security Administration released its Average Wait

Time Until Hean·ng Held Report (For the Month ofJanuary 2016) with regard to obtaining disability
benefits. See, https:/ /vv,V\v.ssa.gov / appeals/DataScts/01_NetStat_Report.html, accessed
March 4, 2016. While one office in the United States had an average as low as 11 months, the
longest wait time was 22 months. Id. The office located in Salt Lake City, Utah, reported an
average wait time of 17 months from the hearing request date. Id. During this interim, many
struggle with maintaining employment and lack the benefits necessary to obtain treatment for
their disabilities. "[P]eople with disabilities often turn to drugs or alcohol as a means of coping
with or self-medicating their problems." See, "Substance Abuse and the Disabled",
http://recovcryfirst.org/ substance-abuse-and-the-disabled.html/.
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In an article titled '1ail Doesn't Help Addicts. Let's Stop Sending Them There" dated
October 17, 2014, Kara Dansky, who is Senior Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union
Center for Justice wrote of a woman named Misti Barrickman, who was disabled by scoliosis
who

started

taking

Oxycontin

to

help

with

the

pain

and

became

addicted.

https: / / \v,vw .aclu.org/blog/jail-doesnt-help-addicts-lets-stop-sending-them-there, accessed
March 4, 2016. Unable to find large quantities of that drug, she eventually turned to what was
readily available in order to self-medicate her pain: heroin. Id. She struggled with addiction
over the next seven years, living between a tent and a jail cell where she racked up charges for
possession and prostitution. Id. Law enforcement in Seattle, Washington, created the Law
Enforcement Assisted Diversion program that focused on connecting people with drug
addictions directly with treatment and services rather than jailing them. Id. Misti Barrickman
no longer lives in a tent and has been sober as of the date of the article for two (2) years. Id.
Dansky noted that, "[f]or decades, this country has been waging a failed war on drugs.
Drug use hasn't gone down. Drugs are just as available as they used to be. Instead of solving
our drug problem, we've become a society that seemingly disregards millions of lives ... " Id.
She wrote further that, "[d]rug addiction has become one of the many social problems that
we've relegated to the criminal justice system. But as with homelessness and mental illness,
handcuffs and jail cells haven't made things better and have cost much more than the
treatment and services that can. It doesn't have to be this way. America can safely reduce our
reliance on incarceration." Id.
Attorney discipline proceedings as well as military coun-marshal proceedings both
provide helpful insight into the way in which an offense that is the product of a disability
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should be weighed. In the military court-marshaling case of United States v Cooley (No. 18,841),
it was held as follows:
When one's physical condition is such as actually to ... cause the commission
of an offense, the question is not one of reasonableness, but whether the
accused's illness was the proximate cause of his crime. This case is not one of
balancing refusal and reason, but one of physical impossibility to maintain the
strict standards required under military law. In such a situation, the accused is
excused from the offense if its commission was directly caused by his condition,
and the question whether he acted reasonably does not enter into the matter.

Ibid., 16 USCMA 24, 36 CMR 180 (1966). The Office of the Presiding Judge of the Supreme
Court of Colorado quoted the follO\ving caution taken from the American Bar Association
comment to Standard 9.3:
Issues of physical and mental disability or chemical depencency [sic] offered as
mitigating factors in disciplinary proceedings require careful analysis. Direct
causation between the disability or chemical dependency and the offense must
be established. If the offense is proven to be attributable solely to a disability or
chemical dependency, it should be given the greatest weight. If it is principally
responsible for the offense, it should be given very great weight; and if it is a
substantially contributing cause of the offense, it should be given great weight.
In all other cases in which the disability or chemical dependency is considered
as mitigating, it should be given little weight.

People v. Bendinelli, 329 P.3d 300, 316-317 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2014).
The trial court was well informed through submitted evidence that Atkinson was
disabled prior to his sentencing that occurred on July 21, 2015. On December 22, 2014,
Atkinson's Assessment was filed with the trial court. R0011-4 and R0012-5. The Assessment
provided details of a car accident that Atkinson had been involved in where he sustained
injuries to his neck, shoulder, knees and damage to his spine and back. R0012 and R0013.
Atkinson also indicated that his lower spine was deteriorating from prior injury and genetics.

Id. Atkinson indicated that his injuries were a "chronic medical problem [that] interfered with
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his life." Id. The PSI report was filed with the trial court on July 16, 2015, which contained a
handwritten statement from Atkinson stating that he had recently been declared disabled.
R0076, R0089, R0047, R0089, and R0051. On July 17, 2015, Atkinson submitted a letter to
the trial court where he stated that he had recently been declared disabled by the State of Utah,
Judge Patricia Lammi. R0056.
During his sentencing, Atkinson again informed the trial court that he had been
declared disabled due to a back injury and was in need of surgery on his shoulders. R106:5-6.
Atkinson also informed the trial court that he had recently provided proof of Medicaid. Id.
Atkinson expressed that obtaining disability would allow him to receive the treatment he
needed for his substance abuse issue. Id. Atkinson realized that he had been self-medicating
with illegal substances from injuries sustained to his back and shoulder. Id.
Slack argued during sentencing that Atkinson's underlying issue was his "substance
abuse issue." R106:3. Slack requested the trial court sentence Atkinson to probation and that
he be released from county time for the purpose of substance abuse treatment, treatment
which he would be required to possess and obtain. R106:4. Slack argued that the majority of
the charges would not have existed but for Atkinson's underlying issue with substance abuse.

Id. The trial court sentenced Atkinson to the maximum sentence. R106:7-8.
As a "public entity," the district court herein was under the obligation to guard and
enforce every right secured by Atkinson, including application of the ADA to his sentencing
proceedings and determination of whether he was eligible for probation. O'Grady, 312 U.S.
329, 61 S. Ct. 572; Briggsat,I26; 42 U.S.C.A. § 12131; KC at,I 16. The ADA and Rehabilitation
Act prohibited the district court from denying or discriminating against Atkinson, who is a
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qualified disabled individual having been approved for disability, with regard to his receiving
the benefits of its services and programs, including probation. See, 42 U.S.C.A. §12101(b)(1),
(2), and (4); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132; Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §794(a) and (b)(l)(A) and

(B).
Atkinson's charges to which he plead were two (2) counts of DUI, Identity Theft,
Forgery, and Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. Each of these were eligible for a downward
departure, jail time, or probation. The probation services as a sentencing option by the district
court and as overseen by AP&P are generally accepted as either "services" or "programs",
directly falling under the ADA as a product of court proceedings and supervised by the State
agency, requiring application of the ADA to Atkinson as a qualified individual thereunder. See,

e.g., UTAH CODE .ANN. §77-18-1(8)(a)(viii); Robinson at ,I 15; Feme at 151; LA. at ,I2; Saunders
at 899; Yesk~y, 524 U.S. at 210, 118 S. Ct. at 1955, dti11g Sedima, S.P.RL, 473 U.S. at 499, 105
S.Ct. at 3286. The Rehabilitation Act and ADA interpreted in pari matena encompass all
operations of the court and/ or AP&P ,vith regard to probation. Frame at 223, citing 29 U.S.C.
§794(a).
The district court herein maintained an "affirmative obligation to accommodate" in
sentencing Atkinson based on its knowledge of his disabilities, particularly given that his
disabilities directly impacted the crimes for which he was convicted. Lane, 541 U.S. at 532-33,
124 S.Ct. 1978. Atkinson's injury did not occur until after he was sentenced; however, the
district court maintained an affirmative obligation to accommodate him during that sentencing
under the ADA. Atkinson should have received leniency as an accommodation, with the
district court exploring further options of a downward departure, jail time or probation rather
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than the harshest sentence for each of the crimes and an order of prison time, which gave no
accommodation at all to the fact that his crimes herein were a direct result of his disabilities.

Frame, supra.
Although the Rehabilitation Act and ADA do not address accommodations, the trial
court was well within its authority to provide a reasonable modification for Atkinson. Novak,

supra, citing C.F.R. § 35.130(6)(7). To grant Atkinson probation or another more lenient
sentence would not have fundamentally altered the nature of the sentencing or probation
services or programs. Novak, citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(6)(7). Further, the accommodation of a
modification to Atkinson's sentence was required to avoid discrimination based upon his
disability. Id., citing Wis. Cmty. Seros. at 751; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(6)(7). Atkinson's disabilities were
present during the two-year span of the directly related criminal charges; however, the district
court utilized this as an aggravating circumstance to erroneously avoid application of the ADA
or Rehabilitation Act. It is a fact that Atkinson's prior criminal history indicated no substance
abuse since his juvenile years, and that it began when he became disabled. With the average
wait time in Utah being 17 months for a disability hearing, and Atkinson's admission that he
realized he was self-medicating his disabilities, the district court should have recognized these
circumstances

to

accommodate

him

with

a

more

lenient

sentence.

https:/ hvw,v.ssa.goy / appeals/DataSets/0t_NetStat_Report.html, accessed March 4, 2016.
The district court could have affirmatively ameliorated the effects of Atkinson's disabilities in
this case through leniency. Novak, citing Oconomowoc Residential Programs at 784. The
accommodations would not have been unreasonable since all of Atkinson's charges were
eligible for leniency and, in fact, it would have been both efficacious and proportional cost-
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wise. Id., dting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(6)(7), Oconomowoc Residential Programs at 784 (dting Vande Zande
at 543).

It was proper for Atkinson to raise his disabilities as consideration regarding the
services being provided to him by the sentencing court. He is a qualified individual with a
physical disability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1)(A)-(C), (2)(A), and (3)(A); see also Ball at 59697. However, Atkinson likely also falls under the protection of the ADA with regard to his
recovery from drug and/or alcohol addiction. Pac. Shores Properties, dting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12132.
Atkinson was excluded from participation in or denied benefits of the sentencing and/ or
probation programs or services by the district court, and such exclusion was directly based on
his disabilities given their proximate causation of the crimes to which he plead. Rohan at if25,

citing Gohierat 1219(quoting Tyler at 1439).
Atkinson's case is unfortunately not unique-there are nearly 1.5 million disabled who
currently need substance abuse treatment. While there is an increased chance for substance
abuse among the disabled in general, Atkinson's spine and back injuries place him in the
heightened category of individuals where half of all sufferers are substance abusers.
Unfortunately, Atkinson and so many others are the product of an agency and court system
that are equipped with, but are not utilizing their resources to help ameliorate the effects of
the disabled who come under their authority. Courts frequently encounter individuals who are
disabled and have been drawn into drug addiction in an attempt to cope with such disabilities
while they await the very slow system of getting disability benefits. See, Disabled World, supra;
and ''Physically and Developmentally Disabled: Specialty Program for Physically and
Developmentally Disabled Patients", supra;Average Wait Time Until Hearing Held Report (F'or the
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Month ofJanuary 2016), supra; "Substance Abuse and the Disabled", supra. These individuals,
like Atkinson, are the product of a lack of appropriate and accessible substance abuse
prevention and treatment services-services that are "not attitudinally, physically, financially,
or cognitively accessible to people with disabilities." Id.
Until such time as prevention services can be put in place, the courts will face an
increasing number of these types of cases. Currently there is no regulation on how our courts
should handle these circumstances other than through its discretion in sentencing; however,
frequently such discretion is exercised without giving the disability sufficient weight as the
causation of the substance abuse crimes. Instead, the courts are simply sentencing to jail or
prison rather than helping the disabled get the help they need. Atkinson is a prime example
with his record of offenses coinciding with his becoming disabled, his remorse at the paths he
chose, and his desire to do better now that his disability benefits have finally been approved.
However, Atkinson is instead in prison, continuing to suffer more consequences for
circumstances affecting half the people in his precise situation.
As Dansky, Senior Counsel of the ACLU stated, jail does not help addicts, particularly
those who became addicts due to disability, like Misti Barrickman and like Atkinson. Ibid.,

supra. Law enforcement in Seattle, Washington created a program focused on connecting
people with drug addictions directly with treatment and services rather than jailing them. Id.
Interestingly, AP&P's own website indicates that they do the same thing with probationers in
Utah-it specifically lists the services provided to the public as "acting in the role of a police
officer, court adviser, mentor and social worker" with duties that include "ensuring that they
comply with conditions of probation . . . assist[ing] offenders with obtaining the basic
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essentials to survive ... includ[ing] housing, employment, school, training, food, treatment,
therapy

and

counseling."

http://corrections.utah.gov/index.php?option=com

content&view=article&id=845:adult-probation-parole&catid=10&Itemid=262,

accessed

March 4, 2016. Although society has relegated drug addiction to the criminal justice system,
our system is not without the capacity to handle it in a way that cost-effectively aids in
rehabilitation. In reliance on Atkinson's particular circumstances where his disabilities were
the underlying cause of his substance abuse issues that were at the heart of all of the charges
to which he plead herein, leniency in the form of ADA accommodation towards a downward
departure, jail time or probation would have safely provided the proper services to Atkinson
to ensure success.
Although weighing of circumstances for sentencing typically affords a trial court a
heightened discretion, ..Atkinson's particular circumstance herein does not appear to have been
directly addressed by our courts in Utah. \vbere the offense is a product of an individual's
disability, other courts have indicated that the weighing of circumstances changes. In certain
cases where the physical condition caused the commission of the offense, the question alters
from reasonableness to physical impossibility to the extent of absolution. Coolry, 16 USCMA
24, 36 CMR 180. However, ..Atkinson's case is not quite as clear cut at this one since Atkinson
still bore a choice in the crimes he committed, as he indicated both in pleading and at
sentencing. The American Bar Association provides interesting insight where it pertains to
their own regulations over offenses, specifically setting out a careful analysis for issues of
physical and mental disability. \vbere an offense is proven to be attributable solely to a
disability or chemical dependency, it is to be given "the greatest weight." Bendinelli at 316-317,
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quoting ABA comment to Standard 9.3. Even if it is principally responsible, it should be given
"very great weight", or "if it is a substantially contributing cause of the offense, it should be
given great weight." Id. Herein, the trial court only gave Atkinson's disabilities little weight,
which was only as a "mitigating" factor-meaning not one directly related to the offenserather than the heightened weight attributable to proximate causation.
There is a striking difference between those who are brought into the criminal system
as a result of this societal issue of using substance abuse to cope with various physical and
mental disabilities like Atkinson, and those who are users who are not disabled. However, our
courts have been providing little if no accommodations for the disability causation, although
the ADA clearly applies and the courts have an affirmative obligation to accommodate them.
Atkinson's disabilities should have been given much greater weight in determining his
sentence, weighing in favor of a downward departure, jail time or probation. This is particularly
true when considering the other factors argued further below.

B. THERE WERE EXTENUATING FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES WITH
DEFENDANT'S FIANCEE'S DIAGNOSIS WITH PROGRESSIVE
CANCER.
In U.S. v. Hernandez-Castillo, the defendant requested a variance in sentencing based
upon his extraordinary and unique family circumstances-he was an illegal alien having been
previously deported and his wife was a United States citizen but was ill and had undergone
several surgeries. Ibid., 2007 WL 1302577 (D.N .M.). Therein it analyzed the following case:
[I]n United States v. Spedden, 917 F.Supp. 404 (E.D.Va.1996), the Honorable
James C. Cacheris, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Virginia, granted a downward departure in a case where the defendant had
presented evidence that both his wife and his nine year old daughter suffered
from life-threatening medical conditions. See id. at 406-07. In granting a
departure, Judge Cacheris reasoned that the defendant's case presented
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"extraordinary and unique family circumstances," because "the actual family
structure stands to be utterly decimated by the realistic possibility of the death
of not one, but two immediate family members while the Defendant is
incarcerated and unable to provide any normal, day-to-day parental assistance
to sustain his family." Id. at 408. Judge Cacheris opined in United States v. Spedden
that "the cumulative nature of two extraordinary medical hardships in the
Defendant's immediate family makes this a case of sufficient importance and
magnitude to justify a downward departure." Id. (internal quotation omitted).

Id. In U.S. v. Spedden, the court found that "extraordinary and unique family circumstances
justify a downward departure and that a sentence different from the guidelines 'should result."'

Ibid., 917 F. Supp 404,408 (E.D. VA. 1996). Although the Hernandez-Castillo case differentiated
its facts from the cases cited therein to ultimately decline the relief requested, it did not
specifically differentiate Spedden's holdings. Id. at *6-7. It found that "all families suffer and
there is hardship whenever a sentence is imposed." Id. at *6. Further, "[t]he Court believe[d]
that the focus ... is on the loss of caretaking and financial support for the defendant's family
that a defendant's incarceration would cause .... support for an ill family member may manifest
in forms other than, or in addition to, financial assistance." Id.
Atkinson's fiance was diagnosed with progressive cervical cancer. Atkinson expressed
that the thought of not being able to be there for his fiance in her time of need was a much
harsher punishment than any sentence imposed. R0056. Atkinson requested a lenient sentence
so he could be there for his fiance, his family and receive the proper treatment. R0057.
Nonetheless, the trial court sentenced Atkinson to the maximum sentence. R106:7-8.
Atkinson was not technically seeking a variance, but rather exercise of the court's
authority to apply a more lenient sentence that was available. However, his circumstances
likely would have supported a variance or a downward departure, the latter of which is always
available to a judge in sentencing determinations. See, Hernandez-Castillo; Spedden; UT.AI I CODE
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.ANN. §76-3-402(1).

Atkinson presented evidence that his fiance was suffering a life-

threatening medical condition. As argued supra, he also presented information that he was
physically disabled, with "chronic medical problem[s] [that] interfered with his life." R0013.
These were "extraordinary and unique family circumstances" because "the actual family
structure [stood] to be utterly decimated by the realistic possibility" of the death of an
immediate family member while Atkinson was incarcerated and unable to provide day-to-day
assistance to sustain his family. Spedden at 408. The cumulative nature of both Atkinson's
disabilities and his fiance's progressive cancer diagnosis-two extraordinary medical hardships
in Atkinson's immediate family-should have justified leniency in the form of a downward
departure, jail time or probation. Id.
Although all families suffer hardship, the loss of Atkinson's presence in the home
through his prison sentence is likely to bring about the realistic decimation of his family while
he is incarcerated. Id. By serving the maximum sentence, Atkinson would not be able to be
there for his fiance in her time of need. Atkinson would not be able to provide any day-to-day
care, be a shoulder to lean on, or to act as support system for her during treatments and/ or
necessary procedures that may have been required with a progressing disease. If Atkinson's
fiance's condition were to worsen, Atkinson would not be able to say final goodbyes or create
that one last opportunity for a lasting memory. Also, by serving the maximum sentence,
Atkinson could be denied the opportunity to marry his fiance and live a happy life together as
husband and wife. Atkinson asked the trial court for a chance so that he could be there for his
fiance and his family.
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Atkinson and his family are presently enduring hardships with him having to serve the
maximum sentence. Atkinson's fiance had a daughter to support. R106:6. Atkinson's fiance's
health was failing. Atkinson needed to be a caregiver for his fiance and her daughter, but
cannot do so from behind the prison walls. The trial court did not give adequate weight to
Atkinson's family needs during his sentencing. \Vhen combined with its failure to afford
sufficient weight to Atkinson's disabilities, it is clear that the trial court abused its discretion.

C. DEFENDANT'S SINCERE REMORSE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY SUPPORTED MITIGATION.

ACCEPTANCE

OF

A Utah district court gave an insightful summation that "[p]robation 'is for people who
admit their guilt, acknowledge the enormity of what they have done and want to be
helped."' State v. Asbcrr!ft, 2014 UT App 253, 1 6, 338 P.3d 247. Timely remorse, recognition
and affinnative acceptance of personal responsibility for the offense are factors contained in
the federal sentencing guidelines as to whether a reduction of the level of offense should occur.

See, e.g., U.S. Spedialieri, 910 F.2d 707 (10 th Cir. 1990)(''Whether a defendant should be granted
a two-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility depends upon whether the defendant
'clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for
his criminal conduct." (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), \vith the burden of proof established as
preponderance of the evidence); U.S. v. lf/ach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1039-40 (10 th Cir. 1990)("[Al
defendant who clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal
responsible for the offense ... in a time!yfashion ... is appropriately given a lesser sentence than
a defendant who has not demonstrated sincere remorse.").
Atkinson provided a letter to the trial court where he expressed how remorseful he was
and also apologized to the trial court and to his family for the crimes that he had committed.
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R00S6. Atkinson personally addressed the trial court during sentencing admitting he had made
mistakes. R106:5.

Atkinson sought forgiveness from the court and his family.

R0056.

Atkinson wanted to be helped and expressed a strong desire to receive treatment. Atkinson
also admitted that he had been self-medicating with illegal substances.
Atkinson was amenable to probation given the extenuating circumstances listed above.
Further, he admitted his guilt by pleading guilty to five (5) crimes, acknowledged the enormity
of what he had done and asked for help from the court by way of sentencing that would
provide him the ability to seek the care he needed while being there for his family in their time
of need as well. Ashcroft at iJ 6. His timely remorse, recognition and affirmative acceptance of
personal responsibility met the preponderance standard and should have weighed in favor of
a downward departure, jail time or probation. Spedialieri (dting U.S.S.G. § 3El.1(a)). It would
have been appropriate for the court to give Atkinson a lesser sentence than a defendant who
had not demonstrated sincere remorse; however, having been given the maximum sentence
for each charge, it is clear that he received the same sentence as those who had no disability,
no extenuating family circumstances, and no sincere remorse for the crimes committed. U?'"ach
at 1039-40. The district court erred in weighing the circumstances and not granting a
downward departure, jail time, or probation to Atkinson.

D. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE
NUMBER OF CRIMES COMMITTED AND THAT DEFENDANT WAS A
THREAT TO THE PUBLIC.
Atkinson was afforded his opportunity to address the district court and present
information in mitigation of his punishment or sentence. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 77-18-1(7); UT.
R. CRIM. P. 22(a). As mentioned supra, the Court had various sentencing options available to
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it, being able to sua sponte grant a downward departure, order jail time in a suspended sentence,
or order probation either through suspended sentence or as the sentence itself. UTAH CODE
ANN. §76-3-201(2) and §76-3-402(1).

The district court's oral findings relied entirely on two factors in aggravation: that
Atkinson had numerous crimes committed all within a two (2) year period of time; and that
he may present a threat to society since one of the victims of one of his crimes was his own
brother (Identity Theft). However, as mentioned supra, the time frame in which the crimes
were committed coincides with the time frame following .Atkinson becoming disabled and up
until he was granted disability and benefits to enable him to obtain assistance for his
disabilities. His recent criminal history also coincided. As he admitted, he was self-medicating
during this time, but exhibited sincere remorse at the choices he had made, particularly with
regard to his brother. The factual determination of the district court erroneously failed to fully
consider Atkinson's circumstances, which is evidence from the Court's statement that the
numerous crimes were "not acceptable" and thus supported no leniency. l'Vforeno at ,nJ 12-13.
The district court's sentencing decision is subject to review by this court. Moreno at if10,
dting Strunk. The district court identified the aggravating circumstances on the record, but

failed to articulate what it considered to be mitigating circumstances that affected its
sentencing decision. Id. However, since Atkinson presented the information regarding his
disabilities, his fiance's condition, and the remorse he felt for what he had done, it can be
presumed that the trial court considered these legally relevant factors. However, it appears to
have lacked full information and did not undertake the decision with careful deliberation of
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the relevancy of these factors. Moreno at ,I10, citing Strunk. Atkinson's character, background
and history should have been given greater weight as argued supra. Agmelles at ,I105.
Not all aggravating and mitigating factors are equally important, however, the ones
cited herein by Atkinson are significant. Killpack at ,I59. His disabilities should have been given
greater weight, as should his extenuating family circumstances and remorse. Instead, these
were set aside due to the number of crimes at issue (although all of them were attributable to
some extent to the disabilities) and the concern about his impact on society (although society
favors rehabilitating drug users, particularly where it is more cost-effective in the long run).
The aggravating listed by the district court were insufficient to outweigh the numerous
significant mitigating circumstances. Killpack at if59.
Atkinson's sentence was not appropriate for him in light of his background and the
crimes committed. Lindsey at ,I 12, quoting McCJendon at 729. As argued supra, it did not serve
the interests of society underlying the criminal justice system since society favors rehabilitating
those who abused substances as a direct result of their disabilities while awaiting approval for
benefits. Id. Given the nature and circumstances, the sentencing court should have concluded
it was unduly harsh to record the convictions for the degree established by statute, and should
have entered a judgment for the next lower degree in favor of rehabilitation and based on
incapacitation. UTAH CODE .ANN. §76-3-402(1); Sotolongo at ii 5, q11otin,_g Rhodes. The district
court maintained authority to offer leniency, but erroneously chose not to do so at all. Perea at

,Il 14, citing Shelby at 988.
\Vhile the sentence did not exceed statutory or constitutional limits, the district court
did fail to fully consider all legally relevant factors by improperly minimizing Atkinson's
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disabilities that directly impacted commission of the crimes, as well as his extenuating family
circumstances and remorse. Post at iJ 2. This resulted in a sentence that was so inherently unfair
as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Id., quoting Sotolongo at iJ 3. No reasonable person would
take the view that Atkinson should receive the harshest sentence on each crime given the
circumstances argued herein. Wright at 1120, citing Gerrard at 881(citing Harris). Atkinson's
sentence was unjust. Id.
Atkinson was more appropriately situated for probation given these circumstances.

Ash,,TOjt at iJ 6. The. trial court was empowered to place Atkinson on probation to serve the
ends of justice and comport with the public interest Id., citing Valdovinos at ,r 23. This record
gives more infonnation on .Atkinson's character, personality and attitude than most, providing
sufficient infonnation for the district court and this Court to determine that he was amenable
to probation. Rhodes at 1049, quoting Silbert at 393. The district court thus exceeded the bounds
of its discretion and the Judgments should be reversed, with the matter remanded for
resentencing with the proper weight given to the circumstances raised herein.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Atkinson respectfully requests that this
~

Court reverse the Judgments and remand for re-sentencing to give proper weight to Atkinson's
disability, extenuating family circumstances, and remorse.
DATED this 7th day of March, 2016.
CARLING LAW OFFICE, PC

f~lf) /
Altom!]for Appellant Dennis R.
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TROY A. LITTLE - USB #9061
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite #201
P.O. Box428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 865-5310
Telecopier: (435) 865-5329

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, and
COMMITMENT

STATE OF UTAH~
Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 141500765

DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
03/31/1974

Judge Keith C. Barnes
Defendant.
----·-·

-,

--------•---

The Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense
of Failure to register as a Sex Offender~ a Third-Degree Felony, on June 2, 2015, and the Court
having accepted said plea of guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a presentence
investigation report, and after said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the matter
having been called on for sentencing on July 21, 2015, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named
Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, having appeared before the Court in person together with
his attorney of record, Jeffery E. Slack, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney Troy A. Little, and the Court having reviewed the sentencing
recommendation and ha\i;ng further reviewed the file in detail and thereafter having heard

(.i
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statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney, and the
Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment,
Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
DENNIS R. ATKINSON has been convicted upon his/her plea of guilty to the offense of Failure
to register as a Sex Offender, a Third-Degree Felony, and the Court having asked whether the
Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no
sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the
Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.

SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, and pursuant
to his conviction of Failure to register as a Sex Offender, a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby
sentenced to a term of zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, pay a thirtythree dollar (S33) Court Security Fee for his conviction of the offense.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed herein shall be seived
concurrently with the sentences imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 141500700, 141500765 &
15150070 I~ but run consecutively with Criminal Case No. 151500294.

COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
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YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
and deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in
accordance with the above foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.

END OF ORDER
(If approv~ court signature will appear at top of first page of this document)
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The Order of Court is stated below:
/ ~ ..:"~t.;:/f: :: .- \.
Dated: August 12! 2015
Isl KEIT~ C~ }
04: 19:03 PM
Districf--ColufJ~e /

~-<:'>)_~ ;~;:/

TROY A. LITTLE - USB #9061
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
82 North I 00 East, Suite #201
P.O. Box428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 865-5310
Telecopier: (435) 865-5329

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
·- - - - - - - - - - - - -

STATE OF UTAH~

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, and
COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
VS.

DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
03/31/1974

Criminal No. 14150070 I
Judge Keith C. Barnes

Defendant.
- - - - - ------The Defendant, DENNIS R. AlKINSON, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense
of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Third-Degree Felony. on June 2,
2015, and the Court having accepted said plea of guilty and thereafter having ordered the
preparation of a presenteoce investigation report, and after said report was prepared and
presented to the Court, the matter having been called on for sentencing on July 21, 2015, in
Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, having appeared
before the Court in person together with his attorney of record, Jeffery E. Slack, and the State of
Utah having appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney Troy A. Little, and the
Court having reviewed the sentencing recommendation and having further reviewed the file in
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detail and thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Chief
Deputy Iron County Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and
enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to wit:
JUDGMENT

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADruDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
DENNIS R. ATKINSON has been convicted upon bis/her plea of guilty to the offense of Driving
under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Third-Degree Felony, and the Court having asked
whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced,
and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that
the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted
SENTENCE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, and pursuant
to his conviction of Dri\ting under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Third-Degree
Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, pay a thirtythree dollar (S33) Court Security Fee for his conviction of the offense.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed herein shall be served
concurrently with the sentences imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 141500700, 141500765 &
151500293, but run consecutively with Criminal Case No. 151500294.

COMMITMENT

TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH:
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YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
and deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confmed in
accordance with the above foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Comminnent.

END OF ORDER
(If approved, court signature will appear at top of first page of this document)
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The Order of Court is stated below:
/ -\·;~:;/~ \:.
Dated: August 12~ 2015
Isl KEITfl C·~;6.S }
04: 18:40 PM
District,Co~ge /

·<:~:~-~~\J>. .

TROY A. LITrLE - USB #9061
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite #201
P.O. Box428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 865-5310
Telecopier: (435) 865-5329

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, and

COMMITMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
03/31/1974

Criminal No. 151500293

Judge Keith C. Barnes
___ ...... __ P~fendant_: ______ _______ . ___ . _________ .. ______ .. _ _ ________________ _

The Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense
ofldentity Fraud, a Third-Degree Felony, on June 2, 2015, and the Court having accepted said
plea of guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report,
and after said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the matter having been called on
for sentencing on July 21, 2015, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, DENNIS
R. ATKINSON, having appeared before the Court in person together with his attorney of record,
Jeffery E. Slack, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron
County Attorney Troy A. Little, and the Court having reviewed the sentencing recommendation
and having further reviewed the file in detail and thereafter having heard statements from the
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Defendant, his attorney, and the Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and
Commitment, to wit:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
DENNIS R. ATKlNSON has been convicted upon his/her plea of guilty to the offense of Identity
Fraud, a Third-Degree Felony, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything
to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the
contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as
charged and convicted.

SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, DENNIS R. A TKlNSON, and pursuant
to his conviction of Identity Fraud, a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of zero
to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, pay a thirtythree dollar (S33) Court Security Fee for his conviction of the offense.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed herein shall be served
concurrently with the sentences imposed in Criminal Case Nos. I 41500700, 141500701 &
141500765, but run consecutively with 151500294.

COMMITMENT
TO 1HE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
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and deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in
accordance with the above foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.

ENDOFORDER
(If approved. court signature will appear at top of first page of this document)
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The Order of Court is stated below:
l , ·l~~-: -~ · \
Dated: August 12! 2015
/s/ KEITl-l C~~~ }
04: 19:23 PM
Districf-Couif~e /

. .:til~t)~)···

TROY A. LITTLE- USB #9061
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite #201
P.O. Box428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 865-5310
Telecopier: (435) 865-5329

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

----

••------

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, and
COMMITMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
03/31/1974

Criminal No. 141500700
Judge Keith C. Barnes

___ Defendant.

_ ___ _

The Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense
of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Third-Degree Felony, on June 2,
2015, and the Court having accepted said plea of guilty and thereafter having ordered the
preparation of a presentence investigation report, and after said report was prepared and
presented to the Court, the matter having been called on for sentencing on July 21, 2015, in
Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, having appeared
before the Court in person together with his attorney of record, Jeffery E. Slack, and the State of
Utah having appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney Troy A. Little, and the
Court having reviewed the sentencing recommendation and having further reviewed the file in
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detail and thereafter having heard statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Chief
Deputy Iron County Attorney, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and
enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and Commihnent, to wit:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
DENNIS R. ATKINSON has been convicted upon his/her plea of guilty to the offense Driving
under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a Third-Degree Felony, and the Court having asked
whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced,
and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that
the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.

SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, and pursuant
to his conviction of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and/or drugs, a Third-Degree Felony,
is hereby sentenced to a term of zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, pay a thirtythree dollar (S33) Court Security Fee for his conviction of the offense.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed herein shall be served
concurrently with the sentences imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 141500701, 141500765 &
151500293, but run consecutively with Criminal Case No. 151500294.

COMMITMENT
TO TIIE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
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YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
and deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in
accordance with the above foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.

ENDOFORDER
(If approve~ court signature will appear at top of first page of this document)
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Addendum ''E''
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, dated August 12, 2015
(Criminal No. 151500294; Appellate Case No. 20150707)
(the "20150640 Judgment")
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TROY A. LITTLE - USB #9061
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite #201
P.O. Box428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 865-5310
Telecopier: (435) 865-5329

IN THE FIFTH ruDICIAL D1S1RICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH't

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, and
COMMITMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
03/31/1974

Criminal No. 151500294

Judge Keith C. Barnes
_!?efendant. ____________.. __________________________ .. __________ _

The Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense
of Forgery, a Third-Degree Felony,. on June 2, 2015, and the Court having accepted said plea of
guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report, and
after said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the matter having been called on for
sentencing on July 21, 2015, in Cedar City, Utah, and the above-named Defendant, DENNIS R.
ATKINSON, having appeared before the Court in person together with his attorney of record,
Jack B. Bums, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron County
Attorney Troy A. Little, and the Court having reviewed the sentencing recommendation and
having further reviewed the file in detail and thereafter having heard statements from the
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Defendant, his attorney, and the Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney, and the Court being fully
advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and
Commitment, to wit:

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
DENNIS R. ATKINSON has been convicted upon his/her plea of guilty to the offense of
Forgery, a Third-Degree Felony,. and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had
anything to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to
the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as
charged and convicted.

SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, DENNIS R. A TK.INSON, and pursuant
to his conviction of Forgery, a Third-Degree Felony, is hereby sentenced to a term of zero to
five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON, pay a thirtythree dollar (S33) Court Security Fee for his conviction of the offense.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence imposed herein shall be served
concurrently with the sentences imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 141500700, 141500701 &
141500765, but run consecutively with 151500293.

COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, DENNIS R. ATKINSON,
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and deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in
accordance with the above foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.

ENDOFORDER
(If approved. court signature will appear at top of first page of this document)
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Addendum ''F''
Determinative Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
...\. U.S. CONST. .1.\MEND. VI states the following:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
haYe been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be infonned of the narure and cause of the accusations; to be
confronted with the ,vitnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining ,vi.messes in his fayor, and to haYe the assistance of counsel for his
defense.

B. Rehabilitation ...\ct, 29 U.S.C.A. §794(a) and (b)(1)(A) and (B) state as follows:
(a) Promulgation of rules and regulations
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as
defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance ...
(b) "Program or actiYity" defined
For the purposes of this section, the term "program or acti"ity" means all of
the operations of(1 )(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of
a State or of a local goYernment; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance
and each such department or agency (and each other State or local governmental
entity) to which the assistance is extended, in case of assistance to a State or
local goyemment; ...
any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
C. .AD. .\, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102 states in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Disability
The tenn "disability" means, with respect to an individual(.\) a physical or mental impainnent that substantially limits one or more major life
acti-dties of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impainnent; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impainnent (as described in paragraph (3)).
(2) Major life acfrrities
(...\) In general
For purposes of paragraph (1 ), major life activities include, but are not limited to,
caring for oneself, perfonning manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
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walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.
(B) Major bodily functions
For purposes of paragraph (1 ), a major life activity also includes the operation of a
major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowe~ bladder, neurologic~ brain,
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.
(3) Regarded as ha-ring such an impainnent
For purposes of paragraph (l)(C):
(..:\) An individual meets the requirement of ''being regarded as having such an
impairment7' if the indiYidual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an
action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a
major life activity.
(B) Paragraph (l)(C) shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor.
..:\. transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6
months or less.
D ...:\DA, 42 U.S.C..A. § 12131 states that ''[P]ublic entity" includes "(B) any department,
agency, ... of a State or States or local government; .... "
E. AD..:\, 42 U.S.C..A. § 12132 states that, "[s]ubject to the provisions of this subchapter,
no qualified incfuidual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.".
F. UT R. CRIMP. 22(a) states in pertinent part as follows:
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity
to make a statement to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or
to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting
attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material
to the imposition of sentence.
G. UT.AH CODE .ANN. §76-3-201(2) states the following:
Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination
of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to remo·rnl or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after .April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
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(f) to death.
H. UL\H C0DE..,.\NN. §77-18-1(2)(a) states the following:
On a plea of guilty . . . the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may
place the defendant
(i)
on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(.ti)
on probation with an agency or local government or with a priYate
organization;or
(rii)
on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
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